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PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF CRIMINAL INSANITY*
Henry Weihoient
MENTAL DISORDER AS A DEFENSE

T

HE logic of the law's recognition of mental incapacity as a
defense to crime is simple enough: usually, crime involves
the concurrence of a wrongful act and a wrongful intent; if the defendant because of his mental condition was incapable of entertaining the intent, he cannot be held guilty of the crime. The man
who kills another by unavoidable accident is not a murderer. The
man who walks off with a suitcase believing it his own is not a
thief. So, too, the man who kills or takes possession of property
while in a state of disordered consciousness is not held guilty.
The essential intent varies from crime to crime. If the charge
is murder, the state of mind which the prosecution must establish
is "malice aforethough't"-a highly technical term which it is
sufficient for our purposes to define as an intent to so something
seriously endangering life or limb. If the charge is assault and
battery, a high degice of carelessness is enough. Some crimes require a "specific intent." i.e., an intent to do a certain thing, as
distinguished from a more generally wicked or careless state of
mind. Thus, one can be held quilty of arson only if he intended to
burn a building; carelessness, no matter how gross, is not enough.
Nor can one commit larceny carelessly; specific intent to deprive
the rightful holder of possession is required. Psychiatrists may
object that this legal concept of "intent" is a naive oversimplification of the process by which a person "makes up his mind" to commit a crime. They may object still more to the further legal rule
*The substance of this article will appear in a hok, PswclJrA'rv AND T4E LAW. by
Professor Henry Weihofen and Dr. Manfred S. G(itmacher, io fiepublished later
this year by W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.
rnvbr, N#.w Mexico State Bar:
tProfessor of Law. University of New Mexico;
author of INSANITY AS A DEFENSE tN CIMINA. LW ( 19::), MAY'S :HJMINAL LAW (4th
ed. 1938, with K. C. Sears) and numcruus arlich, iii various law imrnals.
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that although intent is essential, motive is irrelevant (except insofar as self-defense, prevention of felony, etc., can be said to be
based on motive). Once it is determined that a man intended to do
the act, the inquiry is at an end; the law is not interested in why he
meant to do it. To the psychologist, this is a curious notion, for he
cannot conceive of trying to understand human behavior without
asking why the individual acted as he did. Why did this man kill
his wife? Why did this other commit a series of rapes? Why do
others under similar circumstances refrain from doing likewise?
Only when we can answer the question "Why?" can we hope to
understand why society needs protection against some individuals
and not others. Studies made in recent decades, such as Sheldon
and Eleanor Glueck's "Five Hundred Criminal Careers", and their
more recent "Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency", have convincingly shown that criminal conduct is ordinarily a product of a
complex of pressures and resistances rather than of a single mental
operation of forming an "intent". Only through studies of these
conscious and unconscious motives can understanding be had of
the personality of the individual and what it is that makes him a
menace to society. It is time for a re-examination of the criminal
law dogma that motive is irrelevant. But in the meantime intent remains the legal formulation, and we must deal with it if we are to
understand the criminal law.
It might seem from what has been said that the only question on
the element of intent should be the factual one: did the defendant
at the time of the act have the intent essential to constitute the
crime charged? Insanity cases would differ from cases of unavoidable accident, mistake, or somnambulism only in that the former
would call for expert psychiatric opinion, but the issue would still
be whether at the time of the act charged the defendant had the
intent to kill, or to steal, or to burn. But the courts have preferred
to lay down more specific "tests" of insanity. Perhaps this is due
to the pervasive human tendency to reduce broad and basic principles to rules of thumb; perhaps it is due to the feeling that rules
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of thumb are more comprehensible to juries. In most jurisdictions
the test adopted is that to avoid responsibility for crime, the defendant must be so insane as not to know the wrongfulness of his
act.
The leading authority on the subject is M'Naghten's Case,' decided in England in 1843. M'Naghten had shot and killed the
secretary to Sir Robert Peel under the influence of a form of
mental disorder symptomized by delusions of persecution, in
which Peel appeared as one of the persecutors. After the jury had
returned a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity," popular
interest in the case led the matter to be made the subject of debate in
the House of Lords, where it was decided "to take the opinion of
the judges on the law governing such cases." Five questions were
put to the fifteen judges of England regarding the existing law of
insanity. Both questions and answers were befogged by verbosity,
but the rule which has survived is that to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be proved that the accused "was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he
did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." This
"right and wrong" test, as it has come to be known, remains to
this day the sole test of criminal insanity in England and in most
American states.
The test actually comprises two tests: (a) knowledge of the
nature and quality of the act; and (b) knowledge of its wrongfulness. But most courts seem to assume that this wording is merely
another instance of lawyers' redundancy, and that the two clauses
say essentially the same thing. Therefore, they very often omit the
first part, and word the test merely in terms of knowledge of right
and wrong. Perhaps the judges feel that the latter is more graphic
for purposes of instructing a jury. But this narrows the test. Knowledge of the nature and quality of the act is a broader and more
inclusive concept than knowledge of wrongfulness, at lcast if un1 10

CI. & F. 200 (1843).
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derstood in the light of present day psychological teachings. Gestalt psychology emphasizes the importance of looking at behavior
as a whole. We might well take a page from the book of the primary school educators who in recent years have been studying the
psychology of reading. We read, it now appears, not letter by letter, but by whole words, whole phrases and even whole lines at a
time. Much of our behavior proceeds by such wholes, such configurations of details.
A defendant may remember many details of his act. The prosecutor may emphasize this fact, may bring out all the little details that the defendant can recall, and may argue from this that
the accused has been shown to know what he was doing. But memory of details is not knowledge of the nature and quality of the
act. That calls for something deeper and more vital. And it is the
deeper understanding that the legal test requires-or at least what
it should be deemed to require. The Iowa court's wording of the
test,' which emphasizes knowledge of the "nature and consequences" of the act. therefore is preferable to the more common
wording which emphasizes knowledge of right and wrong.
The word "wrong" as used in the test contains a patent ambiguity. Does it mean legal wrong, or moral wrong? If a disordered
person commits a criminal act, knowing it is forbidden by the law,
but believing himself to have been commanded by God to commit
it, can it be said that he knew it was "wrong"? Or to put a stronger
case, and one which is not merely hypothetical: the defendant not
only knew that the act was a crime, and would subject him to punishment, but the very reason why he committed it was because he
knew that was so; he was under a delusion that he was divinely
commanded to save the human race by sacrificing his own life. He
therefore killed in order that he might be legally executed and
thus fulfill his divine mission. He comes within the test if "wrong"
2 Although the instructions actually given by tile Iowa trial courts vary somewhat,
the wording approved by the state supreme court makes die test "power rationally to
comprehend the nature and consequences of the act." State v. Beckwith, 46 N.W. 2d
20 (Iowa, 1951); State v. Buck, 205 Iowa 1028, 21) N.W. 17 (1928). Other Iowa
cases are extensively reviewed in a Note, 32 Iowa L. iRev. 714 (1947).
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means morally wrong. But if it means "illegal", he is guilty.
Amazingly, the judges in MAaghten's case, in their prolixity,
answered this question both ways. At one point they said that a
person is punishable "if he knew at the time of committing such
crime that he was acting contrary to law; by which we understand
your lordships to mean the law of the land." Yet in their next answer they said, "If the question were put as to the knowledge of the
accused solely and exclusively with reference to the law of the
land, it might tend to confound the jury by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essential
in order to lead to a conviction: whereas the law is administered
on the principle that everyone must be taken conclusively to know
it without proof that he does know it." It is amazing also that in
the hundred years and more that have since elapsed, most courts
have continued to use the word "wrong" without troubling to define it. One of the few cases to discuss the point directly is a New
York case decided in 1915.' One Schmidt, a priest, was charged
with the murder of a woman with whom he had been having an affair. His defense was that he had heard the voice of God calling
upon him by night and by day to slay her, and that lie had yielded
to the call in the belief that it was his moral duty: Judge Cardozo's
opinion for the court contained a scholarly review of tie history of
the test and concluded that "wrong" means moral wrong. The Tennessee and Texas courts have held to the contrary; knowledge of
the unlawfulness of the act is enough to render the accused responsible, even though he acted under a delusion that the deed was
commanded by God.4 This holds persons suffering from some of
the most extreme forms of mental disorder to be legally sane and
responsible.
The legal and scientific soundness of the M'Naghten case rule
:1People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945 (19151.

McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442, 242 S. W. 883 (1922) , Watson v. State, 133 Tenn.
14M. 180 5. W. 168 (1915): Harrison v. State. 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 164. 69 S. W. 500
(1902).
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has been the subject of endless debate.5 Almost every phrase has
been subjected to both legal and psychiatric criticism. Psychiatrically, the more important criticisms that have been advanced are:
(1) the questions and answers were intended to cover only cases
of psychosis characterized by delusion; the judges knew that the
questions referred to the case of M'Naghten, a paranoid individual
with a fairly circumscribed delusional system; (2) the answers
were premised upon psycho-pathological notions which only remotely conform to present-day psychiatric conceptions; (3) concepts of "right" and "wrong" belong to ethics; mental disorder
cannot easily be interpreted in terms of its influence on ethical
knowledge.
One of the most vocal of the present-day psychiatric critics, Gregory Zilboorg, recently said in an address,
To force a psychiatrist to talk in terms of the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong and of legal responsibility is-let us admit
it openly and frankly-to force him to violate the Hippocratic Oath,
even to violate the oath he takes as a witness to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, to force him to perjure himself for the sake of justice.
For what else is it, if not perjury, if a clinician speaks of right and
wrong, and criminal responsibility, and the understanding of the
nature and the quality of the criminal act committed, when he, the
psychiatrist, really knows absolutely nothing about such things, when
they are presented to him in terms of a hypothetical question, based
on legal assumptions and hypothetical psychiatry .... It is quite obvious
that the immoral, paradoxical situation has become more and more
acute in the course of the past twenty-five years, during which we have
learned more about psychopathology than during the previous century

and a half.
5 A few of the numberless books and articles discussing the M'Naghten case rules
are: GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925) ; WEIHOFEN, INSANITY
AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW (1933) ; WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

(1923) ; ZILBOORc, MIND, MEICINE AND MAN (1943) ; Barnes, A Century of the McNaghten Rules, 8 Camb. L. J. 300 (1944) ; Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defence
to Crime in English Criminal Law, 12 Calif. L. Rev. 105 (1924) ; Keedy, Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 535, 724 (1917) ; MacNiven, Psychoses and
Criminal Responsibility, in MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND CRIME (Radzinowicz and Turner
eds. 1944) ; Menningtcr, Medico-Legal Proposals of the Anerican PsychiatricAssociation, 19 J. Crim. L. & Criminniogy 367 (1928); Tulin, The Problem of Mental Disorder
in Crime: A Survey, 32 Col. L. Rev. 933 (1932).
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Another able critic, Dr. Philip Roche, recently wrote along
somewhat similar lines,
The tests of responsibility as expressed in the M'Naghten Rules are
untenable propositions, not only within the discipline of scientific medical psychology, but also in operation in that they constitute an improper
shifting of an onus of decision to the person of the expert witness. In
the light that the M'Naghten Rules are propositions that have no consensus with established psychiatric criteria of symptomatic description
the test questions are unanswerable. With the possible exceptional instance of a case of disturbed consciousness or of idiocy, no entities of
medical disorder can be correlated with matters solely confined to the
faculty of knowledge as explicit in the Rules. The test questions do not
articulate with the facts of experience of the psychiatrist as a scientist,
but they are meaningful to him as a member of the community as they
are indeed to his fellow citizens who participate with him in the trial
of an offender. In this legal convention the psychiatrist finds himself
in a dual role; one as a scientist who brings technical information to
the trial process, to the outcome of which he should be indifferent, the
other as a fellow member of a social order who shares a value judgment
in his answer to the questions of right and wrong.
That these men voice the views of American psychiatrists generally is clear from the responses of over three hundred in a recent poll. Their opinions in regard to the M'Naghten Rules were:

Satisfactory ...................................................
12%
Unsatisfactory .................................................
80%
Fairly satisfactory ..............................................
5%
Unsatisfactory but best yet proposed ............................
21/2%
These psychiatrist critics are supported in their views by some
legal writers and judges. Chief Judge Biggs of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, speaking for himself and two other members of
the court dissenting in a recent case, said, "The law, when it requires the psychiatrist to state whether in his opinion the accused
is capable of knowing right from wrong, compels the psychiatrist
to test guilt or innocence by a concept which has almost no recognizable reality."'
6Smith v. Baldi. ............
F. 2d ---_--_-(1951).

.,
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Collaboration between law and psychiatry in criticizing the
right and wronmg test dates back at least to 1886, when Judge Henderson Somerville of the Supreme Court of Alabama was assigned
the case of I'arsons v. State7 for opinion and decision. Working in
close collaitoralion with his chess-playing friend, Dr. Peter Bryce,
as eminent a physician as Somerville was a judge, he wrote what
has become the leading case adopting the so-called irresistible impulse test.
The failure to recognize "irresistible impulse" as a daren.e has
been one of the serious points of attack on the right and wrong
test. Since our criminal law is based on an assumption of free will,
we should not punish men for what they cannot avoid. As an abstract proposition, this is unquestioned. "All the several pleas and
excuses," said Blackstone, "which protect the committer of a
criminal act from the punishment which is otherwise annexed
thereto, may be reduced to this single consideration, the want or
defect of will."' Yet the English and most American courts refuse
to apply this general proposition to the case where lack of free will
is the result of mental disease. The reasons which these courts have
given for this refusal-when they have given reasons-are four:
(1) a disbelief that any truly irresistible impulse exists; (2) a
feeling that even if it does exist. it is too difficult to prove or disprove to allow as a defense; (3) the defense is one dangerous to
society; and (4) statutes setting forth the right and wrong test prevent courts from adopting any other.9
Whether a truly irresistible impulse can exist is a question for
psychiatrists rather than for judges to decide, and dogmatic judicial denials that such a condition is possible have rather gone out
of fashion. The problem of proof is a real one, but it is not peculiar to cases where alleged irresistible impulse is involved; it may
7

81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 83-1.

5 4 1L. CoMm. *20.

') The arguments against the irresistible impulse test are well stated in HALL, GEiN.
LAW (1947) C. 14; and in Waite, Irresistible Impulse

E!AL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINM..

and Criminal Liability, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 443 (1925). See also
OF VIOLENCE

(1949).
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also be difficult to prove capacity or incapacity to know right from
wrong. The solution lies in improving procedures so as to provide
the courts with more scientific assistance, rather than in rejecting
certain defenses merely because they are difficult to disprove. The
courts which have said that irresistible impulse is a dangerous doctrine and which have warned of calamitous consequences if it were
recognized, have never deigned to support their forebodings with
any evidence to show that such consequences will result, or that
they have resulted in the seventeen states l0 where the defense is
recognized. No statistics have ever been published proving that
recognition of irresistible impulse tends to break down the administration of justice.
A more recent and more sophisticated objection has been ably
presented by Professor Jerome Hall: irresistible impulse does not
and cannot exist concomitantly with unimpaired knowledge of
right and wrong. It is alleged that recent investigations show that
even in kleptomania, the intelligence does not remain unimpaired.
Also, the theory of the "integration of the self" postulates that the
various functions of the personality are not separate, but interpenetrate one another and act as a unit. Serious mental disease impairs all aspects of the psychological organism, and therefore
there can be no case of irresistible impulse where the rational
functions, including knowledge of right and wrong, are unaffected.
But while it is true that the affective, cognitive and the conative
processes of the mind are interrelated, certain forms of mental
disease may affect one more than the others. A disorder manifesting itself in impulsive acts may affect intelligence swnewhat, hilt
it is quiie possible that impulsiveness may have reached lhe poilt
where it can be said that it is "irresistibhe," and yet intelligecl! bas
'"Thc rrim
sislibl inmpu l st
haI. b5o acIca.
L wd in
( nt,,,ticui , Ilaware, District of (C Iir,,i,iia, Illinois,
Nbs
Miciigan, MUniana, N.w Mixi,, Ohio,
ing. altilol gh the (44cisions in a ff:w of Ithf -iti t s arlt!
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not deteriorated so much as to obliterate knowledge of right and
wrong.
The term "irresistible impulse" is not a very good one. "Irresistible" implies that the person was absolutely unable to resist;
"impulse" suggests an urge that is sudden and overwhelming but
momentary. Such conditions exist-for example, in the irrational
acts of confused epileptics, paralytics and schizophrenics-but
they are rare."' More common are urges which are not wholly irresistible, and which are not of sudden overwhelming force. Most
exhibitionists, for example, have enough control not to yield to
their impulse in the presence of a policeman. And if they were
sure that they would be punished by torture or death, they would
almost certainly restrain themselves. Nevertheless, they are the
victims of urges so strong that most normal persons could not resist them under most circumstances. Or, to put it another way, their
power to resist is less than that of most persons. Both the strength
of the impulse and the individual's power to resist must be taken
into account; in a sense, these are merely two aspects of the same
phenomenon. Perhaps some other term such as "inability to adhere to the right" would be preferable to "irresistible impulse" to
express this idea. But, however expressed, there is no doubt that
I Among psychiatrists, Dr. Frederic Wertham of New York has been most blunt
in denying that serious crimes can be committed under irresistible impulse. In his
book, THE SHOW OF VIOLENCE (1949) 13, 14, he says:
There is with one exception no symptom in the whole field of psychopathology
that would correspond to a really ungovernable or uncontrollable impulse. That
exception is an obsessive-compulsive neurosis.... Yet compulsions play no role in
criminal acts.... It can be stated definitely and flatly that compulsions are always
unimportant and harmless acts. A patient may have to count the windows of a room
of a building, he may have to wipe off the doorknobs with his handkerchief (for
fear of germs), he may have to avoid stepping on the cracks of a pavement, he
may have to leave the elevator on the twelfth floor and walk tip to the thirteenth;
but he never has to commit a truly compulsive criminal act....
In the whole literature of psychiatry and psychoanalysis there is not a single
case where a violent act, homicidal or suicidal, constituted a symptom in an obsessivecompulsive neurosis. It is therefore always bad psychopathology to speak of a compulsive murder or a compulsive suicide.
The medico-legal theory of the irresistible impulse is advocated only by laymen
and by psychiatrists who are scientifically not sufficiently oriented. It lends an air
of scientific literalness and accuracy to a purely legal definition without any fooundation in the facts of life or science.
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some individuals are subject to abnormal urges which they have
little power to control.
But, it may be argued, this reduces "irresistible impulse" to
something which is not psychopathic at all. All men are subject to
strong urges of various kinds, and most of us are weak enough to
give way to them at times. How is the law to distinguish between
the exhibitionist or the kleptomaniac and the man who steals a loaf
of bread for his starving children or the bank clerk who steals
several thousand dollars because he thinks he has a system which
will not be found out? We must distinguish between impulses
which are the result of extrinsic and those of intrinsic motivations.
The starving condition of one's family is an extrinsic provocation;
a psychopathic urge to steal unneeded articles is intrinsic. The line
is admittedly not always easy to trace; frequently motivations will
be mixed. But conceptually the distinction is clear enough.
Whether the law ought to recognize the irresistible impulse
defense does not depend merely upon scientific questions such as
whether such a condition can truly exist and whether it is susceptible to proof. The fact that alcoholic intoxication can exist and
can be proved does not automatically answer the question what
legal effect it should be allowed. A discussion of the desirability
of allowing irresistible impulse as a defense quickly leads us back
to a consideration of the fundamental purposes and premises of
the criminal law.
Why do we punish criminals? Strange as it may seem, there is
no agreement among those who should know best what we are trying to accomplish by our penal law. Historically, the purpose was
rather clearly retribution. That "he who sins must suffer" seemed
a matter of elementary justice, or a categorical imperative of thc
moral law. But justice does not call for retribution from one who
had no wrongful intent, or who did not act from choice. On this
premise, irresistible impulse should be accepted as a dc'eense, for
there is no justice in punishing a person for what he could not
help.
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But retribution is not generally accepted today as the primary
purpose of punishment. Rather, we say the purpose is deterrence.
By the threat of punishment, or by its actual infliction, or by the
example of its infliction on others, we hope to deter individuals
from committing anti-social acts. An individual who labors under
irresistible impulse cannot be deterred, and so there is no purpose
in holding him criminally responsible.
It may be argued, however, that deterrence is not merely a matter of deterring the given individual. Punishing even those who
cannot refrain from acting might still serve as a threat and an example to others, and impress them with the serious view that the
law takes of such conduct. Secondly, and more important, know.
ledge that the act is punishable and the consequent fear of punishment may be one of the stimuli tending to restrain the impulse,
and to that extent a factor making the impulse resistible. Even
under the most extreme deterministic theories, observation or
knowledge that others have suffered pain in consequence of certain conduct is an experience impression which goes to influence
the mechanistic translation of the impulse into action. The threat
of punishment may tip the scales enough to make resistible an impulse otherwise irresistible. But this is true only of those who are
to some degree capable of understanding the nature of their act, of
anticipating future consequences and of being guided thereby.
There are persons whom the threat of punishment cannot deter;
they do not "respond" to reward and punishment in the normal
way. A person who is incapable of understanding that a certain act
is punishable or of anticipating the punishment cannot be stimulated by fear of such punishment. Nor is the punishment of such a
person very valuable as an example to others. The average man is
not exposed to increased inner temptation at seeing a person go
unpunished who could not understand or avoid his act. On the
contrary, punishing such a person is likely to be repugnant to the
average man's sense of fairness and justice.
Although we might expect the armed forces in courts martial to
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employ a more summary procedure than do the civil courts, the
fact is that both the Army and Navy today employ a level of
scientific jurisprudence which the civilian courts have not yet attained. In the Navy the Judge Advocate General seeks medical
counsel from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery before handing
down legal opinions in cases involving behavior problems. The
Legal Medicine Branch acts only in an advisory capacity but has
been given the widest latitude in appraising problems of culpability. The Army during World War II had a bulletin prepared dealing with psychiatric testimony before courts martial. The irresistible impulse was included in deciding whether the defendant was
insane at the time of the act charged.
In England, although proposals to establish irresistible impulse
as a defense have been rejected, in practice the courts in cases
where the issue is raised instruct the jury that if a man's will
power is destroyed by mental disease, it may be that the disease so
affected his mental powers as to destroy his power to know what
he was doing, or that it was wrong. Where this thought is sufficiently emphasized in ihe charge to the jury, it is probably sufficient to obtain a verdict of insanity in cases of ascertainable psychosis or epilepsy involving such automatism as to enable experts
to testify that the person was unable to know the nature and quality
of the act or, if he did know it, to know that it was wrong. Moreover, under the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1884 the Home Secretary
is empowered to intervene after sentence and before execution, to
appoint a committee of medical men to examine into the prisoner's
present sanity and to substitute commitment in lieu of the criminal
punishment. In this investigation the committee applies the same
psychiatric standards as in other commitment proceedings. This
affords a psychiatric check on the operation of the legal test of
responsibility which makes the administration of the latter much
less mechanical arid inflexible than in most of the American states
which assume that they are adhering to the English rule in holding
strictly to the right and wrong test.
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Actually, the controversy over irresistible impulse is of less
practical than it is of doctrinal importance. The instances of
crimes committed as a result of truly irresistible impulse are certainly very few. The defense is not usually urged in court in the
kind of cases where clinically we should expect it most, namely,
in larceny and arson cases, but is typically raised as a defense to
murder, where it is highly improbable. The reason, of course, is
that persons accused of crimes for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for a relatively short term of years are not
likely to defend by urging their own insanity, for which they may
find themselves committed indefinitely; but to a defendant facing
a possible capital sentence, irresistible impulse may serve as
"something to seize when nothing more tangible is evident."
Psychiatry today has advanced beyond the point where addition
of the irresistible impulse test could be deemed adequate to
remedy the deficiencies of the right and wrong test. Both tests fail
to give due emphasis to the fundamental concept that the mental
processes are interdependent and interrelated. Projective psychological tests have demonstrated how mental disorder affects every
facet of the intelligence. Both of the established tests fail particularly to provide adequate bases for judging severe psychoneurotics and others whose criminal acts often seem to stem from unconscious motivations. All of us, the normal as well as those not
so normal, are more influenced by our emotions than by reasoning.
Although the actor may be conscious of only one motive, his
mental attitude and his physical behavior in response to a given
stimulus or situation is almost certainly the end product of a complex of psychological processes. The criminal, even more than the
rest of us, may be largely unaware of the reasons for his behavior." Of this. the legal tests take no cognizance whatever.
It is time that the law caught up with present-day psychiatric
understanding of the overspreading influence of mental disorder.
The courts could take one step in this direction with relatively little
12

Abrahanen .,,tivJtiol

of Crime, 26 B. U. L. Rev. 91 (1946).
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disturbance of precedent, by reformulating their rules governing
burden of proof. While definite proof should be required of the
existence of mental disorder, when it is once shown that the defendant has such a disorder, the burden should be on the prosecution to prove that he was nevertheless capable of knowing the
nature and quality of his act and that it was wrong, and (where
irresistible impulse is a defense) that he acted with volition. The
courts have not made this distinction between proof of mental disorder and proof of criminal irresponsibility but have too frequently used the ambiguous word "insanity" to refer to both. This
very ambiguity, however, would make it relatively easy to reconcile the ambiguous precedents with the suggested rule. In half the
states the rule now is that while all persons are in the first instance
presumed to be sane, if evidence is introduced to raise a reasonable doubt in the matter, the ultimate burden is on the prosecution
to convince the jury that the accused is sane within the legal test of
responsibility. In these jurisdictions conversion to the rule suggested
would require only that the courts recognize that establishing the
existence of mental disorder creates a reasonable doubt of responsibility. In the other half of the states the defendant has the
burden not only of creating a reasonable doubt, but of ultimately
convincing the jury that he was irresponsible within the meaning
of the legal test. But most of these states have held, and probably
none would deny, that evidence of permanent, chronic or continuous mental disorder at some time prior to the crime will be
presumed. to have continued and to have existed at the time of the
crime, unless the contrary is proved. It is true that most of the
cases so holding say that the effect of this presumption is merely
to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence. In Texas,
however, it has been held that the presumption of continuance not
only shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence but the
ultimate burden of convincing the jury. The Texas cases show how
a court which nominally places the burden of proof oil defendant
can, by use of the presumption of continuance, inake the practical
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operation very similar to that under the opposite rule, placing the
ultimate burden on the prosecution. Georgia, Missouri, and South
Carolina cases also contain wording which could without much
straining be reconciled with the rule proposed. In other states that
put the burden of proof on the defendant, reconciliation could be
effected by converting the presumption of continuance from one
which only shifts the burden of going forward with evidence to
one which shifts the ultimate burden of conviction.
Delusions have at times been made the subject of special legal
rules. Although in one of their answers the judges in M'Naghten's
case laid down the right and wrong test, in another they said that
if a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts commits
an offense in consequence thereof, and assuming "that he labours
under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane ... he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists
were real."
How this "mistake of fact" test was supposed to fit in with the
"right and wrong" test was not made clear. The latter, said the
judges, was to be given "in all cases." The former, it seems, was
not intended as a substitute, but at most was a supplemental rule.
The explanation for the special reference to delusion as a test or
symptom is historical. In 1800 Lord Erskine, in his eloquent defense of Hadfield, 13 had stated that "delusion ... where there is
no frenzy or raving madness, is the true character of insanity."
Hadfield suffered from systematized delusions that like Jesus
Christ he was ordained to give his life for the world's salvation.
He therefore shot at King George III, that by the appearance of
crime he might be executed and so make the sacrifice he felt
divinely called to make. He was acquitted, more because of Erskine's brilliant discourse than because of the soundness of his
law. Since the judges in M'Naghten's case were purporting merely
to state the existing law, they apparently felt obliged to accept this
"

Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1282.
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precedent as law, but they narrowed the inquiry by making it
purely objective; the delusion must not only be externally and apparently connected with the crime, but the connection must be such
as to render the act justifiable if the facts of the delusion had been
true.
This naively legalistic attempt to devise an external, objective
standard by which to judge the conduct of mentally disordered
persons has been the butt of devastating criticism by both medical
and legal authorities. Medically, it is error to single out one symptom of a disease pattern, which in fact may be no more important
than other symptoms. Legally, the main criticism made is that by
this test a person acting under a delusion is judged by the same
standard as a sane person. As Dr. Isaac Ray said, a lunatic will
not be held responsible for his act, provided only that he acts with
reason and propriety.4 This was what Judge Ladd of New Hampshire in 1871 called the "exquisite inhumanity" of the rule. "It
practically holds a man confessed to be insane," he said, "accountable for the exercise of the same reason, judgment and con.
trolling mental power, that is required of a man in perfect mental
health. It is, in effect, saying to the jury, the prisoner was mad
when he committed the act, but he did not use sufficient reason in
his madness." 5
There was no inhumanity in the rule as the judges in
M'Naghten's case conceived it. The rule applied, they said, where
the person is "labouring under such partial delusion only, and is
not in other respects insane." A person "not in other respects insane" could quite rightly be expected to reason about the subject
of his own delusion as well as a sane man. The difficulty is that
no such person exists. The judges' assumption that a person might
suffer fron delusion and yet be otherwise unaffected mentally was
based oni medical misconceptions of the time, the now exploded
theories of monomania and phrenology. Monomania was described
-15 Slalt' v. Jones, .50 N. It. 369, 387, 388 (1871).
j:AL JURIISPRJ:ENCE
IAY, NIUM
R

(5th ed. 1871) 49.
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in the 1830's by the great French alienist, Esquirol. It was essentially a state of mind characterized by the predominance of one
insane idea, while the rest of the mind was normal. James Cowles
Prichard, the leading English alienist of the time, accepted the
entity as one of the four types of insanity. Phrenology dates from
1810-1819, when Gall and Spurzheim's four famous volumes on
the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system appeared, announcing their theory that the brain was a bundle of some twentyseven different organs presiding over the different traits of the individual. The dominance of each trait was supposed to depend
upon the size of that part of the brain, and this could be ascertained by studying the shape of the skull. This half-scientific, halffanciful conception was in 1843 being hailed as the long-sought
key to the mystery of the mind. With its concomitant, faculty psychology, it continued in favor almost to the end of the century. It
was only natural that the fundamental tenets of these theories
should influence the judges in formulating a rule which presupposed a person suffering from "partial delusion" and "not in other
respects insane." Today, phrenology has followers only among the
more gullible patrons of gypsy fortune tellers, and the rule it engendered has been widely repudiated, but it still remains the law
in Florida, Utah and perhaps several other states.
The New Hampshire court has rejected all the legal tests that
have been devised, and has held that the question of responsibility
for crime is one of fact for the jury. The only rule the court should
give the jury is that if the defendant had a mental disease, and the
act charged was the product of that disease, they should acquit.
Under the New Hampshire rule the ultimate question to be determined is "whether, at the time of the act, he had the mental capacity to entertain a criminal intent-whether, in point of fact, he
did entertain such intent."16 It is, of course, frequently very difficult to prove whether an act was or was not the product of mental
disease. A prominent psychiatric author said in 1918, "It is a long
16 Id. at

382.
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road from the demonstration of the possibility to that of the probability or the certainty of a causal connection between the disorder
as it exists and the deed of which the person stands accused."' 7
For this reason other courts, when they have taken notice of the
New Hampshire rule at all, have rejected it as impractical. "Only
Omniscience can say," said the California court, "whether the
act would have been committed had the taint not existed."' 8 But
less-than-omniscient judges and juries find it difficult also to say
whether an accused knew right from wrong, or acted under an irresistible impulse.
No one has ever demonstrated that the New Hampshire courts
have more difficulty than others, or that New Hampshire juries return more dubious verdicts. It is true that the New Hampshire rule
turns the problem over to the jury with a minimum of legal rules
to guide them, but the lawyers' faith in elaborate instructions as
guides which the jury is supposed to take to heart and apply in
arriving at a verdict is probably excessive. Most of the verbal
niceties of instructions which lawyers quibble over, and over which
appellate courts sometimes reverse cases, probably never affect the
jury's actual deliberations at all. We hesitate to admit, even to ourselves, the many extraneous devices that influence jurors. The way
a lawyer dresses, the locale from which he comes, his ability to
address each juror by name weigh more heavily with many jurors
than intricate points of law.
Many of the most competent and thoughtful psychiatrists agree
with the New Hampshire court that it is impossible to write a
scientifically and legally valid definition of insanity. Professor
John Whitehorn of the Johns Hopkins Medical School recently
prepared an informal memorandum on this subject for a Commission on Legal Psychiatry appointed by the Governor of Maryland.
In it Professor Whitehorn said,
17 JACOBY, THE UNSOUND MIND AND THE LAW (1918)

is People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329 (1897).

82.
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Psychiatrists are challenged to set forth a crystal-clear statement of
what constitutes insanity. It is impossible to express this adequately in

words, alone, since such diagnostic judgments involve clinical skill and
experience which cannot wholly be verbalized.... The medical profession would be baffled if asked to write into the legal code universally
valid criteria for the diagnosis of the many types of psychotic illness
which may seriously disturb a person's responsibility, and even if this
were attempted, the diagnostic criteria would have to be rewritten from
time to time, with the progress of psychiatric knowledge.
The New Hampshire court is also on solid ground in holding
that once the presumption of sanity is overcome with evidence of
mental disorder, the prosecution has the burden of proving sanity
beyond reasonable doubt. Present day psychiatric recognition of
the all-pervasive influence of mental disorder justifies a strong
presumption that criminal conduct on the part of a mentally disordered person is the outgrowth of his disorder, and justifies placing on the prosecution the heavy burden of establishing that in the
case at bar, it was not the product of the disorder.
A supposed form of disorder frequently encountered in the
courtroom, though not elsewhere, is "temporary insanity." There
are of course disorders characterized by brief periods of derangement or lapse of consciousness. In epilsepsy, for example, seizures
are often followed or displaced by an automatic state. But such
manifestations, while transitory, are recurrent; epilepsy is anything but a temporary affliction. The temporary insanity dear to the
hearts of defense lawyers, however, is wholly a thing of the
moment; a man without any history of mental abnormality
prior
to the act, and exhibiting no symptoms upon examination afterward, is alleged to have been "temporarily insane" and without
understanding of the nature of his act or its wrongfulness at the
moment of killing (this peculiar malady seems to occur only in
homicide cases). To medical men this is about as likely as a
momentary uremia in a man with perfectly normal kidney function.
It is possible for strong emotional agitation momentarily to
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overwhelm consciousness even in a sane person. As the hackneyed
phrase goes, "Then everything went black." Courts have rightly
taken a dim view of this defense, but if it could be proved actually
to have been the case-a difficult if not impossible task-the defendant should logically not be held responsible, any more than
a somnambulist is held for acts done while sleepwalking. Whether
the courts would accept this view, however, it is impossible to say,
for the issue has seldom been squarely presented. Typically, the
defense made is not that the defendant was a sane man temporarily deprived of consciousness by overwhelming emotional stress,
but that he was "insane", albeit only temporarily, and therefore
must be judged by the conventional insanity tests.
And even though the expert testimony may be adverse to the
contention, a jury whose sympathy is with the defendant may seize
upon it to acquit him when no other door is open. This happens on
occasion where a killing was prompted by the adultery or other
sexual misconduct of the spouse. Except in Texas and a few other
American states, 19 the Anglo-American system of law does not
recognize such misconduct as justification for killing either the
guilty spouse or the third party. The "heat of passion" aroused by
finding one's spouse committing adultery is given weight only to
the extent of reducing the homicide from murder to voluntary
manslaughter. Nevertheless, the inclination of juries to regard such
provocation as a complete justification for killing is so well known
that newspaper writers have elevated it to the dignity of what they
call "unwritten law". The problem of the defense becomes one of
getting the facts of the misconduct to the jury. The "heat of passion"
argument applies only where the killing occurred promptly upon
seeing or otherwise being informed of the adultery, and is not
available if there was time for the average man to cool off and
regain control of himself. Moreover, it is only an argument in
mitigation, and not a full defense. Also, in most states it applies
" Gibson v. State, 44 Ga. App. 264, 161 S. E. 158 (1931) ; Sensobaugh v. State, 92
Tex. Crim. Rep. 47, 244 S. W. 379 (1922) ; N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 41-2414; UTAH
REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 103-28-10. See Note, 2 Tex. L. Rev. 111 (1924).
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only in adultery cases; catching a sister or other female relative in
sexual misconduct with some man is not enough to reduce a killing
to manslaughter.2 It is not strange, therefore, that it is sometimes
contended that learning of the offense created a "temporary insanity" in the defendant. In the sensational Remus case in Ohio a
few decades ago, the defendant killed his wife while divorce proceedings were pending. There had been no immediate provocation,
but by setting up the defense of insanity, the accused was able to
introduce evidence of the wife's infidelity and of a conspiracy to
deprive him of property, and to contend that this drove him insane. The prosecution's experts unanimously declared him sane,
but the jury found him not guilty because of insanity.'
Cases such as this must be accepted as a normal concomitant of
the jury system. Indeed, they can be said to be the justification of
the jury system. No one would claim that a jury is more competent
than the judge to pass upon the literal correctness or truth of the
testimony presented; the only justification for getting a jury's reaction is that we want a community consensus. Taking the verdict
of the jury allows the rule of law to be tempered by the public
sense of justice in hard cases. This has in fact nothing to do with
the defense of insanity as such. It is merely the case of a jury unwilling to apply the law as written, and using any excuse that happens
to be at hand. Self-defense is sometimes similarly used; on unconvincing testimony, the jury find that the adulterer was shot in
self-defense."2
21, The Utah statute, however, includes not only the wife but also the "sister, mother
or other female relative or dependent;" moreover, it applies not only to commission,
but also to attempts to "rape or to defile." Defilement is not limited to sexual intercourse; cuinniliiigus has been held to be included in its meaning. State v. Besares, 75
Utah 141, 283 Pac. 738 (1929).
'1In re Reniis, 119 Ohio St. 166, 162 N. E. 740 (1928). For another illustration
see Arado, Vignettes of the Criminal Courts, 31 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 175, 182
(1940). See Nows. 43 Yale L. J. 809 (1934); 19 Neb. L. Bull. 146 (1940). See also
BiM.siuL.., llOMIC:ID: IN 'rHE UNITED SlATvrrs (1932) 51, 52, discussing the social pressure helhind scth killings in defense of one's "honor."
", For a case involving the defenses of both alleged insanity and self-defense, see
People v. Garippo, 321 111.
157, 151 N. E. 584 (1926). In this case a father killed a Dan
against whox his seven.year old daughler had made a complaint, which in fact was
uintrue. Thv jury found him guilty of matslatighter.
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THE NEW DIRECTION

Fundamentally, why should it make any difference whether a
person who has committed a criminal act was sane at the time and
therefore guilty, or "not guilty by reason of insanity?" In either
case he has shown himself a menace to society, who must be taken
into custody and control. Why worry over whether that control is
based on criminality or insanity?
The traditional answer is that the sane offender is resp6nsible
for his acts and the insane is not, and that this distinction is
morally and legally important. The sane offender is stigmatized
with guilt because he is a responsible moral agent who, knowing
right from wrong, voluntarily chose to do wrong. The insane man
exercised no such free choice. By definition, he did not know right
from wrong; he did not act with criminal intent. It would be unjust
to brand a person a criminal for committing an act which he had
not the mind to understand or avoid. And while it may be true that
the irresponsible offender must also be taken into custody, this is
merely for the protection of society and of himself, and not as
punishment for crime.
"Responsibility," "guilt," "punishment," "crime"-these are
the value-charged words around which the argument revolves.
Guilt carries connotations of moral blameworthiness, of sin. Sin
connotes wickedness of mind. The person who because of mental
defect or disease could not entertain a wicked intent is not
"guilty." He is not responsible. Punishment is for the guilty, not
for the irresponsible.
All this fits in nicely with the average man's notions of natural
justice and morality, particularly with his tendency to identify
criminal punishnent with his own primitive urge to take an eye
for an eye. Only slowly are men of more scientific bent of niiuid
extricating the criminal law from the grip of this qtiasi-religiotis
conception, and replacing it with a more positivist approach. Instead of concentrating upon whether the acucsiscd had siillicivit
knowledge or will power to be held responsih for his act, the
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new approach would start with the proposition that the individual's
social dangerousness and not his moral blameworthiness is the
essential criterion in administering the criminal law. Absence of
fault may indicate absence of dangerousness, as where an act
occurs by unavoidable accident, but while we should not lock a man
up because the head of his axe unexpectedly flew off and killed
another while he was chopping wood, there is the best of reason
for locking up the man who killed another by reason of a mental
disorder from which he is still suffering and which may lead him
to kill again.
There is no more need for the law to exact retribution from the
criminal, according to this view, than there is for doctors to become angry with a diseased individual. Individualized treatment
measures should be adopted in each case to protect society against
further dangerous acts by the accused, by rehabilitating him if that
is possible, and by restraining him in the meanwhile. If he can
quickly be "reformed" and released with safety, we should not
subject him to useless and superfluous punishment, and the public
to needless expense, merely on a metaphysical supposition that
punishment proportionate to the wrong done is a necessary complement of crime. On the other hand, if analysis of the convict's personality indicates that he cannot safely be released, he may have
to spend the rest of his life under legal supervision of some kind,
even though the only crime he has actually committed was a
minor one.
More specifically, this program calls for sharp separation of the
two major questions involved in a criminal trial -ascertaining
whether the accused did in fact commit the act, and, if he did,
deciding what should be done with him. The judicial trial would
be limited to the first question. The legally trained judge is qualified to conduct the trial, rule on admissibility of evidence and
charge the jury on the law applicable to the facts. But after the
defendant has been found guilty-i.e., after he has been found a
proper subject for control and correctional treatment-the dcci-
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sion as to what kind of treatment is niceded calls for a methodology
and talents quite different from those developed by legal training
and judicial experience. The trainling and clinical experience of
the psychiatrist, including his underslanding of the revelations of
adjuvant psychological tests, gives hini a special insight into the
makeup of offenders and qualifies him not only to express an
opinion on the presence of mental disorder, but also to detect
motives, determine the level of intelligence, measure the force and
discretion of anti-social drives, discover guilt-ridden individuals
with an abnormal need for punishment, and evaluate the relative
value of punishment, probation and psychotherapy in individual
cases. Fixing the sentence should therefore either be taken from
the judge entirely and vested in a tribunal composed of experts
qualified to evaluate psychiatric, psychological and sociological
data, or if the judge be allowed to continue to pass sentence, the
sentence should be a wholly indeterminate one, under which the
person could be held as long as necessary, whether that be for a
few days or for the rest of his life. If the wholly indeterminate
sentence seems to vest too much uncontrolled discretion, at least
any maximum and minimum prescribed should be very wide, so
as to allow the administrative agency broad discretion as to the
length of time the person might be subject to control.
Psychologically, it would seem wise to retain the sentencing
judge. The symbol of the wise and just father, punishing wrongdoers, probably adds to the stability of society and to the average
individual's feeling of security.
Crime is a complex phenomenon, and the remedial program
should be individualized as far as possible. Absence of this viewpoint is the reason why so-called reform schools typically fail to
reform. Their accent is on regimentation rather than on individualization.
A central receiving station or clearing house should be set up,
to which every convict would he sent for scientific investigation
and determination of the kind of treatment to be applied and the
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institution to which he should be sent. Any such decisions would
be open to continual revision in the light of the individual's progress or retrogression. Existing probation and parole practices
would have to be overhauled to fit into the new order."3
If this approach were adopted, it would
(1) leave the proper treatment to be determined by experts on
the basis of the individual's case history, prognostic tables, and
his progress, instead of by a judge who lacks the training, the
time, the facilities and the prophetic foresight needed to pronounce in advance the sentence that will prove best in each case;
. (2) make for uniformity of treatment, to replace the notoriously gross differences in judicial viewpoints, which result in
one defendant's receiving a 5-year sentence for an offense for
which another defendant, tried by a different judge, may receive
6 months;
(3) practically eliminate the defense of insanity. This is most
important for our present purpose. The jury, its function restricted
to deciding whether the accused committed the act charged, would
no longer have to consider the state of mind with which the act
was done. All offenders would be accorded the kind of therapeutic
or custodial care appropriate to their individual cases. Those suffering from mental illness would be sent to a mental institutionwhich is what usually happens under a successful insanity plea
anyway. But such illness, instead of being taken into account in
determining whether the defendant was "guilty" or not, would
enter into consideration only in deciding what to do with him.
It is necessary to take care, however, not to allow enthusiasm
for scientific procedures to lead us into administrative absolutism.
There is danger in assuming that the action of an administrative
INSANITY AND LAW (1924) 414; WHITE, INSANITY AND THE
(1923); Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code, 11
Wis. L. Rev. 346 (1936) ; Glueck, Principlesof a Rational Penal Code, 41 Harv. L. Rev.
453 (1928) : Harno, Rationale of a Criminal Code, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549 (1937) ; Men.
ninger, Medico.Legal Proposals of the American Psychiatric Association, 19 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 367, 373 (1928) ; Wilbur, Should Insanity Defense to Criminal Charge
Be Abolished? 8 A. B. A. J. 631 (1922).
23 SINGER AND KROHN,

CRIMINAL LAW
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board composed of psychiatric and sociological experts would
always be wise and good. "Unfortunately, history records other
eventualities-and in places where 'scientific criminology' reached
its highest peak."'"
Safeguarding society should not assume so all-important a role
that we ride rough-shod over the legitimate interests of the individual, his right to fair and decent treatment and to have his life
and liberty held inviolate against unjustified infringement by the
state. Where to draw the line between individual interests and
those of the state is a fundamental issue of modern politics, far
transcending criminal law. It echoes through all the debates about
fascism and communism, the welfare state, rugged individualism,
social security, socialized medicine, loyalty investigations, freedom of speech and press and other political questions of the day.
At least since the time of Jeremy Bentham, the search for the
happy mean has been incessant. There is as yet no agreement that
we have found it. The point is that the problem is a moral one.
Criminology cannot be purely "scientific;" it must face choices
based on ethics, on an articulate philosophical position regarding
the relationship of the individual to society. Developing procedures which are scientifically sound and yet conformable to our
traditional concepts of "ordered liberty" is a task which challenges our ingenuity, but it is certainly not beyond us.
Like so many other reforms deemed highly revolutionary, this
call for the scientific fitting of the treatment to the needs and
potentialities of the offender has, as the Gluecks pointed out, long
been recognized. "It is at least as old as Aristotle." 2 5 A Committee
of the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology urged it in
1919.26 Governor Alfred E. Smith recommended it to the New
York legislature in 1928. "After guilt has been determined by
legal process," he said, "instead of sentence being fixed by judges
24 tAI.L, PRINCIP.ES OF CRIMINAL LAW
25 GIIECK AND GLIECK, AFTER-CONIIIICT

26Rcport of Committee "A" of the

(1919) ;

(1947)

53.

OF DISCIIARII

OF.NiDmIS

(1945)

99.

Insliute, 10 J. Crim. I. & Criminology 184

GILIECK, M:NTAL DISORDERAAND THE CRIMINAL LAW

(1927)

455.
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according to statute, I should like to see offenders who have been
adjudged guilty detained by the state. They should then be carefully studied by a board of expert mental and physical specialists,
who after careful study of all the elements entering each case
would decide and fix the penalty for the crime. I realize the
complexity of such a fundamental change.... It appeals to me as
a modem, humane, scientific way to deal with the criminal
offender.""1
Limited efforts to adopt this approach in insanity cases have
been made in this country in the past, but they have all run afoul
of constitutional objections. As early as 1909, the State of Washington enacted a law providing that insanity should no longer be
a defense to crime, but that if the court deemed a defendant insane, it might order him confined in the state hospital. This was
promptly declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court
because it violated the defendant's right to trial by jury.2" The
right to jury trial, said the court, extended to all the elements of
guilt; mental responsibility was an essential element of guilt, and
therefore could not be taken from the jury. Mississippi in 1928
passed a law providing that insanity should not be a defense to
murder; on conviction the defendant was to be sentenced to life
imprisonment, but the governor was empowered to have him
transferred to a mental hospital if his condition warranted. This
was held to violate due process of law.29
Both of these decisions were premised on the assumption that
our traditional conceptions of responsibility and guilt are immutable and constitutionally inviolate. But this can hardly be maintained. It is true that the general principle that a person should
not be punished criminally unless he did the act with some wrongful state of mind can be traced back at least to the development of
27 Quoted by Judge Cardozo in his lecture on What Medicine Can Do for Law, in
HALL, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO (1947) 371, 375.
28 State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910). The case was criticized
in Rood, Statutory Abolition of the Defense of Insanity in Criminal Cases, 9 Mich. L.
Rev. 126 (1910).
29 Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931).
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Christian ethics, but it did not attain its current formulation until
much more recently. The concept that all men are free moral
agents who are responsible for their acts (with certain exceptions
such-as infants and insane persons), was not a factor in early
law, not even in the classical criminology of Beccaria. It became
of primary importance only with the rise of the neo-classical school
of the French Revolution. In recent times the legislatures have
created a large number of statutory crimes by which various acts
are made criminal whether or not committed with any wrongful
intent. Statutory rape is a fairly well-known example. The court
will listen with callous indifference to a defendant's protestations
that he had no intention of violating the law; that he took particular care to ask the girl her age and she told him she was eighteen;
and that to any reasonable and prudent man she would in fact
appear to be at least eighteen. An even better known example to
most readers are the speed laws. Few motorists have any illusions
that it is a defense that they "didn't realize they were doing
sixty," or that a defective speedometer registered only forty-five.
Laws prohibiting the possession of counterfeit dies, or the sale
of colored oleo, or of liquor to children are other examples. It is
true that almost all such statutes can be construed as merely forcing a person who voluntarily embarks upon certain action, such
as selling food, seducing women or driving cars, to take the risk
of certain unintended consequences, and so can be distinguished
from a proposal to hold persons amenable to the law for consequences happening without their intelligent intention or volition.
But there is nothing in most state constitutions which expressly or
by reasonable implication forbids the extension. It was only by
resorting to vague concepts of "due process,"1"natural law" and
"justice" that the courts were able to find a basis for striking
down the Washington and Mississippi acts.3"
The Washington and Mississippi decisions do not necessarily
foreclose the question of constitutionality of the program outlined
30 See Weihofen, The I!etaphysi,l J gwt o the Criminal Law, 22 A. 1. A. J. 267
(1936).

SOUTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6

above. First of all, the new approach to the crime problem has
gained immensely in popularity since those cases were decided,
so that it is not as likely today to shock the judicial concept of
"justice." Moreover, it is perhaps paradoxical but true that because the present program is much more radical, it may appear
less so. The Washington and Mississippi laws were limited to cases
involving the defense of insanity. Except as applied to such cases,
they did not challenge established criminal law philosophy and
practice. Against the established concepts, they were anomalies,
and the courts judged them in the light of those concepts. But the
present program challenges those foundations themselves and so
invites the courts to re-examine the premises which were taken
for granted in those cases.
Moreover, the basic philosophy of the new approach has already
been accepted in isolated types of situations, so that its general
acceptance now would merely be an extension to all cases of what
is already being done in some. Reformatories, probation, parole,
and the establishment of psychiatric clinics attached to the courts
were steps in that direction, although each in itself was such a
short step that advocates of punishment as an essential corollary
of crime could overlook its significance.
Most of the sexual psychopath laws embrace the positivist viewpoint openly and wholeheartedly. The determination of sexual
psychopathy is placed largely in the hands of experts, using a
scientific rather than a judicial procedure, and the person found
to be a sexual psychopath is committed for as long as may be
necessary for his cure and the protection of society-not for an
arbitrary period fixed by statute or by the court as proper to "pay
for his crime." The juvenile court acts have for years applied a
decriminalized procedure in dealing with children. The Youth Correction Authority Act, promulgated by the American' Law Institute and already adopted, with varying modifications, by several
states and the Federal Government, applies this approach to a
much larger group, youth above the juvenile court age but under
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21, from which a very large percentage of the criminal population
comes. The act provides, first, that when a youth is found guilty
of an offense, there shall be a careful investigation of the cause
of his offending; second, that anything within the bounds of what
is humane shall be done to correct that cause and prevent his
further criminality; third, that when he is released, he shall be
actively helped to live an honest life; and fourth, that if he cannot
be made safe to return to society, he shall be kept in custody for
life. An "authority" would be set up under the terms of the act
and charged with its administration. It is contemplated that this
would be made up of persons chosen from the professions of education, social work, penology and psychology. Convicted offenders
would be turned over to the authority, which alone would have
the power to determine the treatment, except that in capital offenses the judge would retain power to impose death, life imprisonment or a fine. Protection against being kept under control for too
long a time is afforded by provisions requiring the authority to
make periodic re-examination of each case, and to release all persons when they reach the age of 21 (if committed before they were
18) or the age of 25 at the latest, unless the authority applies to
a court for review of an order directing that the person remain
subject to control beyond such time. This prevents arbitrary deprivation of liberty and assures opportunity for a fair hearing on the
question of whether continued control is justified, and yet permits
such continued control-for life, if need be-where protection of
the public requires.
Professor John B. Waite of the University of Michigan Law
School, the moving spirit in the Youth Correction program, frankly
admits that there is no reason why the act should apply only to
youth. It was so limited simply because it is easier to get people
interested in a program to save young offenders than in saving
criminals as a class." If the program proves a success for crimi" Waite, The I'moth Authority Program, in Crimes of Violence, The Report of a Conference on Crime sponsored by the University of Colorado, Aug. 15-18, 1949, p. 90.
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nals Up 1t 21 years of age, people will be sure to ask, why not
try it for the others? California has already taken a step in this
direction, and has set up an Adult Authority with power to determine, within limits, the length of time of imprisonment of felons
not sentenced to death. In England, too, the setting up of a "Treatment Authority" has been recommended, to prescribe and supervise treatment, whether institutional or other, of certain classes of
offenders, particularly young persons. Professor Hermann Mannheim of the University of London has said that "the setting up
of an administrative authority of this kind, endowed with wide
powers, will sooner or later become imperative in most countries,
who wish to make the sentencing policy of criminal courts both
more scientific and more uniform and to produce closer co-operation between courts and the penal system." '
But a crime prevention program must begin with youth long
before the age of sixteen. The psychiatrist working with the criminals would emphasize the truth of the poet's words, "The child is
father of the man." In the vast majority of criminal careers there
are evidences of social maladaptation stretching back into the
years of childhood. All along the road to adulthood there are
milestones clearly marking the way. And the pace seems to be by
geometric rather than by arithmetic progression. It is the conviction of all psychiatrists that the earlier remedial work is begun
with maladjusted individuals the greater the hope of success. If the
question arises whether to use limited funds for building a model
adult prison or for furnishing better probation and psychiatric
services for a juvenile court, we should certainly choose the latter.
Any device that will prevent juvenile delinquency will by the
same measure reduce the incidence of adult crime. School teachers
should have a thorough orientation in how to spot seriously maladjusted children, and there should bIe child guidance clinics to
which they can be referred. The school systems should have
32 MANNHEIM.
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remedial reading and speech classes, vocational classes and shop
centers to aid in the adjustment process.
Professor Sheldon Glueck and his wife Eleanor have clearly
sounded this note in their outstanding study, "Unraveling Juvenile
Delinquency." They suggest:
Fundamental changes in school curricula and teacher training are
also necessary. We must properly recognize the temperamental and
emotional differences and special abilities and disabilities of children
and the role of teachers as parent-substitutes and "ego-ideals" in the
structuring of character. Forcing certain types of children into the
traditional mould results in increased tension and revolt. The problem
calls for greater flexibility in supplying a rich variety of satisfying
school regimes to suit various psychologic and morphologic types.
Character prophylaxis-the testing of children early and periodically
to detect malformations of emotional development at a stage when the
twig can still be bent-is as necessary as are periodic medical examinations. In other words, a preventive medicine of character and personality is a crying need of the times.
Dr. Walter Bromberg has called attention to one group whose
treatment at the hands of teachers is all too frequently unenlightened and harmful. These are the pupils who are deficient in verbal
factors, who suffer from reading or writing disabilities which
interfere with their literate education. Our educational methods
"revolve around verbality, i.e., ideas clothed in words." 33 Many
who are manually quick and skillful are confused when confronted with abstract ideas. The school's emphasis on verbal functions tends to develop neurolic reactions in boys whose mental
aptitudes are predominately non-verbal. These reactions are
heightened by teachers who express their own conscious or unconscious class prejudices by giving pupils to understand that deficiency in verbality will condcin ihem to a life of manual labor
and that manual labor is socially inferior to white collar work.
The feeling of inferiority so engendered may lead to rebellion
and crime.
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One of the most strategic points of attack in any campaign to
reduce juvenile delinquency is the education of parents. They
must be taught a sensible attitude toward children's petty stealing,
sexual explorations and rebellions against authority. More malignant criminals are created in childhood by overly harsh than by
overly indulgent parental attitudes. Burning the fingers that pilfer
from mother's pocketbook may well act as a brand marking a lifetime rebel against law and order.
Crime almost never comes as a bolt out of the blue. This is true
of youthful car larcenists and of bank presidents who have run
afoul of the law. A careful scrutiny of their past behavior will show
that they had been skating on pretty thin ice for some time. The
same can be said of the homes from which deliquents have come. It
is extremely rare to find a delinquent child coming from a nondelinquent home in which there had existed a really healthful
relationship of the parents with each other and with their children.
Anything that will promote such relations will materially reduce
the incidence of delinquency and also of neurotic behavior.
The most hopeful sign for the future is the fact that everywhere
-among psychiatrists, jurists, penologists and among informed
laymen-there has come a recognition that our past methods of
dealing with delinquency and crime have been highly unsuccessful. This ferment and discontent with present methods is necessary
in order to make future progress with a problem as firmly rooted
in social prejudice as the problem of crime. The American Law
Institute has suggested the massive undertaking of writing a model
criminal code, with the help of experts from other disciplines.
The California legislature has appropriated large sums of money
to study sex offenders scientifically. Maryland is embarking on a
new method of recognizing and dealing with psychopathic criminals. The time is now ready for some of our great universities to
embark on a multidisciplined study of crime-which along with
war, disease and poverty is one of today's four horsemen of the
Apocalypse.

